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Shaping the ‘new normal’: An Economic Response to the 





The scale of the British state’s economic response to the pandemic-induced downturn makes it 
clear that, temporarily at least, the Conservative government’s antipathy towards economic 
interventionism and concerns over government debt have been shelved. In this context, the 
question is not one of the capacity to mobilise resources but rather the extent and character of 
the government intervention. The struggle to define the ‘new normal’ of the post-pandemic era 
has already begun. 
Whatever ‘new normal’ emerges, it will be strongly shaped by the economic policy response 
to the Covid-19 crisis. The Conservatives’ crisis response is intended to preserve (at great cost) 
the economic status quo for the post-pandemic world. This approach neglects the numerous 
parallel deep-seated pathologies characterising the UK economy. These include rising 
inequality, low productivity and investment, Brexit-related disruptions, and the need to 
decarbonise the economy by 45% in the current decade to meet obligations enshrined in the 
Paris Accord. With these deep-seated challenges in mind, the resources being mobilised during 
this downturn should not simply be focused on preserving the economic status quo, but rather 
situated within a broader strategy of transformation. This raises a series of key questions which 
will shape the UK economy for a generation. Can crisis interventions ensure people’s 
livelihoods but also tackle other deep-seated challenges facing the UK economy? Can crisis 
interventions form part of a ‘just transition’ towards a greener economy?  
Episodic capitalist crises present opportunities for radical transformation though, as 2008 
shows, those opportunities can also slip by. The scale of interventionism in response to the 
Covid-19 crisis is, in fact, close to what is demanded by the climate crisis; we might see in that 
some partial cause for hope. This article sets out some key elements of the policy agenda for a 
crisis response that is attuned both to the short-term crisis of Covid-19 and the medium term 
crisis of climate. This agenda seeks to decarbonise the UK economy whilst remaining attentive 
to the need to ensure equitability and the provision of basic needs for both current and future 
generations. It is comprised of four primary elements. First, a green fiscal stimulus in the 
nascent low-carbon economy. Second, subjecting companies seeking state aid to an assessment 
of the economic, social and environmental impacts of that aid, in order to determine the extent 
and type of support offered. Third, when state support is extended, an equity stake is taken in 
companies and used to inaugurate a UK Sovereign Wealth Fund. Fourth, reversing welfare 
retrenchment in order to ‘flatten the curve’ and provide a safety net during the downturn and 
sustainability transition. These strategic and conditional interventions would ensure that public 
money is used to create value for the state and simultaneously promote a transition towards a 
more resilient and sustainable economy for the post-pandemic era. 
 
Financing preservation rather than transformation 
The fiscal and monetary expansion we’ve witnessed (which has included a blurring of the 
border between the two, something I have previously argued in favour of)i has allowed the 
government to introduce a startling repertoire of crisis management policies. This has revealed 
the paucity of the austerity logic and the blasé refrains of unaffordability directed at Green New 
Deal proposals in 2019. As Alyssa Battistoni notes in this issue, the proposed $2 trillion Green 
Stimulus package proposed by supporters of a GND in the US was called unthinkable until the 
Trump administration introduced a $2 trillion stimulus of its own (one which lacked any green 
credentials). Yet the fiscal expansion to date may only represent the opening salvo in attempts 
to stave off a capitalist crisis resulting from a virus for which there is no existent vaccine. 
These remarkable crisis interventions have re-drawn the relationship between state and markets 
but, crucially, Sunak’s policy package seeks to keep the ‘old normal’ on life support. It seeks 
to prop up zombie businesses through the pandemic-induced downturn via a generous helping 
of state aid. It constitutes the construction of an emergency ‘bridge’, hastily erected to rescue 
the existing economic model.  
This is reminiscent of the crisis management approach taken in 2008, where the bailouts 
similarly sought to repair the pre-existing growth model rather than transform it based on a 
recognition of its evident failings.ii The indiscriminate and unconditional use of public money 
in that period of crisis management should alert us of the need to be more strategic now. As 
Christine Berry wrote in 2016, the state’s majority stake in RBS was ‘a golden opportunity to 
start taking control of our banks, building a system that really puts people and communities in 
the driving seat’.iii We can’t let such golden opportunities slip through our hands.  
Our economic model is already suffering from significant, deep-seated issues. The dismay at 
rising inequality, falling living standards, declining social mobility, and failing public services 
should alert policy-makers to the dangers of perpetuating the economic status quo. Poverty and 
inequality have both exacerbated, and been exacerbated by, the Covid-19 crisis. Both drive 
higher levels of ill-health, and the poorest suffer disproportionately from poor health and 
overcrowding in housing, which increase vulnerability. The wealthy are more likely to be able 
to work from home, preserving both their income and their health. Meanwhile, the low rate of 
statutory sick pay means low-paid workers may face a choice between going hungry and going 
to work even when suffering health concerns. As Thomas Piketty argues in Capital and 
Ideology (reviewed by David Cowan in this issue), ideology historically plays a crucial role in 
justifying and undermining ‘inequality regimes’. The socio-economic turbulence created by 
the pandemic may test the public’s  acquiescence to an economic model that generates high 
levels of  inequality and poverty. 
Deep-seated economic pathologies surrounding the long-term slowdown of productivity gains, 
investment and economic growth, which have been periodically punctuated by ‘bubbles’, 
should further alert policy-makers to the dangers of rescuing business-as-usual. The expected 
disruptions of Brexit have suppressed growth forecasts further.  
The environmental crisis only strengthens the economic headwinds facing the UK economy. 
Carbon emissions have dramatically reduced (by 58 per cent) in Europe during the lockdowns.iv 
This has prompted some on social media to rejoice that ‘the earth is healing’ as a result of the 
current economic slowdown, with some going further and declaring ‘us’ to be the virus. The 
Malthusian accusation that ‘we’ are the virus is, mercifully, belied by the fact that we (or at 
least most of us) are still here whilst various forms of ecological degradation are abating. It is, 
in fact, not the existence of ‘us’ per se but rather the scale and character of economic activity 
which underpins the ecological crisis. We are living beyond the thresholds of planetary 
boundaries due to the normalised operations of various economic sectors. Accordingly, making 
the necessary 45% reductions to greenhouse gas emissions this decade, stipulated by the IPCC 
if we are to limit climate change,v entails fundamentally challenging entrenched patterns of 
production, trade, finance and distribution. As Jason Moore argued, it is a geological era better 
conceptualised as the ‘Capitalocene’ rather than the ‘Anthropocene’.vi  
If left unaddressed, the economy’s ecological footprint will not only degrade numerous 
ecosystems but also trigger a series of economic convulsions that threaten people’s livelihoods 
(and ultimately lives). As with Covid-19, this includes risks of shortages, disruptions to supply 
chains, the destruction of infrastructure, bankruptcies, the abrupt re-evaluation of asset prices, 
and financial disorder.  
These deep-seated economic, ecological and social challenges intersect with broader 
philosophical questions about how we think about our economy and its purpose. Calls to 
eschew our obsession with economic growth have intensified recently, given its power to 
disguise unequal income distributions and unpaid work in the household as well as rationalise 
policies that exacerbate environmental degradation and societal wellbeing. Instead, we have 
heard calls to prioritise inter-connected social and environmental indicators. Kate Raworth’s 
‘doughnut’ conception of progress could guide our thinking on meeting basic needs within 
planetary boundaries, and has already been adopted by the City of Amsterdam.vii This is all the 
more salient because Covid-19 and the climate emergency both seem to result from an inimical 
relationship between economic systems and the natural world.viii As Cathy Elliott points out in 
this issue, we must disavow framings that see humans as separate from nature, recognising 
instead the need to work in harmony with ecosystems we are all part of. Challenging the 
dogmas of the pre-pandemic age would change how we think about (and re-cast our ambitions 
for) any future economic recovery.  
The evident failings of the economic status quo imply that transformation, rather than 
preservation, would benefit the UK economy’s transition to sustainability and resilience in the 
post-pandemic era. This, however, requires the government to contemplate not only fiscal and 
monetary expansion but also a willingness to engage in a de facto orchestration of 
macroeconomic change. If these systemic pathologies are ignored when devising policy 
responses, public money will be used in order to rescue an economic model which is only 
paralysed in the short-term but at risk of decline in the medium-term. This would be a costly 
mistake. In this crisis, a response is required which combines fiscal and monetary expansion 
with a strategic understanding of how pre-existing economic failings can be addressed through 
selective and conditional interventions.  
 
Greening the crisis response 
What, therefore, would the UK policy agenda look like if it were part of a strategy of just 
transition towards a sustainable and resilient economy? 
(a) Green Fiscal Stimulus 
After a series of missed opportunities, the time has arrived for investment in the nascent low-
carbon economy. This includes investing in renewable energy production, the innovation and 
development of new low-carbon technologies, and the upgrading of infrastructure and 
production systems in the automotive, manufacturing, transport and service sectors. Investment 
in these industries – highlighted as strategically important in the recently revived Green New 
Deal and Green Industrial Revolution discoursesix – must be urgently coordinated by the 
Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy and a revamped Green Investment 
Bank.  
A series of fiscal instruments could support innovation, infrastructural construction and growth 
in low-carbon sectors, whilst training and employing workers immediately will enable the 
schemes pertaining to this stimulus to mobilise at speed when lockdown restrictions are 
relaxed. The green industrial policies deployed by the German, Danish and South Korean 
governments in recent years could serve as useful prototypes.    
In addition to their contribution to decarbonisation efforts, these industries also present an 
opportunity to create well-paid jobs and educational and training opportunities in technology 
development, manufacturing and construction.x These are ‘jobs rich’ projects compared to 
other industries currently seeking bailouts, and promise jobs in ‘left behind’ areas to boot, 
meaning that investment in these industries offer a better return for policymakers seeking to 
suppress levels of unemployment.xi The dual benefits of a ‘green stimulus’ are the reason why 
EU Commissioners and Environment Ministers across Europe have been so effusive in their 
support.xii Moreover, these projects could advance community energy projects and other 
decentralised forms of ownership models. 
This of course entails the government accepting an entrepreneurial role. As Marianna 
Mazzucato has demonstrated, the state long played a greater role in the innovation that 
underpins commercial profits than is widely appreciated, and now it must accept a leading role 
in constructing a greener and more inclusive wave of growth.xiii If it were to do so, it would be 
likely to swiftly encounter a ‘crowding in’ of private investment that is currently dormant. 
A transformational green stimulus should thus be a centrepiece of the policy response. It 
promises to create a new wave of jobs and industries whilst meeting the decarbonisation targets 
enshrined in the Paris Accord – targets intended to mitigate future crises with the disruptive 
potential of Covid-19.  
 
(b) Greater conditionality of state support 
Industries characterised by exploitation, extraction and pollution are using the pandemic to 
request government bailouts and the weakening of environmental and labour market 
regulations. Progressive governments must eschew ‘Shock Doctrine’ approaches and adopt a 
more selective and discerning position when offering support to private companies, based on a 
strict ‘triple bottom line’ assessment of a company’s economic, social and environmental 
impacts. Subjecting companies to this assessment will guide policy-makers’ thinking on 
whether companies ought to receive state support, the terms on which they are, and the form 
that state support should take. This calculi will lead to a more discriminatory approach to state 
subsidies. This may include companies being precluded from receiving state aid (e.g. if the 
company if registered in a tax haven), others receiving loans rather than subsidies, the staged 
phasing out of state support (allowing for a managed downsizing), or providing state aid on the 
proviso that specific business practices are changed (e.g. capping bonuses or dividends, 
employment guarantees, investment in low-carbon technologies).  
The adoption of this principle has already been hinted at by Andrew Bailey, the new Governor 
of the Bank of England, when asked about the possibility of excluding fossil fuel assets from 
the Bank’s future bond purchases. He told a Treasury Select Committee in March 2020 that 
there is ‘a very strong argument’ for recognising the climate-related financial risks in Central 
Bank policy-making and altering the composition of the Bank’s asset portfolio, and that he 
intended to make it ‘a priority’.xiv It remains to be seen whether future rounds of quantitative 
easing match this rhetoric, but it may indicate that the adherence to the principle of ‘market 
neutrality’ - whereby asset purchases conform to the investment preferences of the capital 
markets despite the environmental consequences – is being challenged on Threadneedle Street. 
There is a need to prioritise certain forms of economic activity over others, as only some 
industries will be able to lead a sustainable recovery. Yet, the employment and public goods 
provided by companies that cannot do so must be acknowledged too. Accordingly, bailout 
decisions must be made in the knowledge that a just transition cannot be immediate but phased. 
The restructuring or downscaling of jobs-rich but unsustainable sectors cannot exceed the 
speed of expansion of the low-carbon economy if the provision of basic needs, livelihoods and 
social justice is to be ensured. 
 
(c) Establishing a UK sovereign wealth fund 
The practice of distributing unconditional subsidies at great cost to the taxpayer must be 
consigned to history. The ‘no strings’ approach to the 2008 crisis was met with huge public 
outcry, allowed the discredited economic status quo to remain intact, and set the scene for 
austerity rhetoric subsequently. This time, where state support is offered, taxpayer money must 
be used to take an equity stake in the ailing companies. Purchasing shares will allow the state 
to gain real value from its use of public money, thereby allowing the state to recoup its 
investment when businesses return to profitability and offering a revenue stream thereafter. 
The shares purchased would inaugurate a new UK sovereign wealth fund (the holdings of 
which could swiftly be diversified to include non-UK companies in order to mitigate risk) 
which will create the sort of shareholder value that other countries (most notably Norway) have 
historically benefitted from. This constitutes a new form of government revenue for the 2020s 
that bolsters state capacity, mitigates the need for post-pandemic austerity, and democratises 
the national economy. 
Moreover, this opportunity avails itself at a time when government borrowing is relatively 
inexpensive. The UK government can issue 10-year bonds at a yield of 0.5 per cent (even less 
when factoring in inflation) which, combined with the reduction in share prices, makes the 
current moment opportune for asset purchasing. As Lonergan and Blyth note, ‘by issuing debt 
when interest rates are so low and, in effect, buying assets at very cheap prices, in the medium-
term, the state will simultaneously ensure businesses survive, workers keep their jobs, and the 
state emerges an owner of significant assets’.xv 
The part-ownership of organisations in a democracy may also shift our understanding of what 
business practices in those organisations the citizenry is willing to tolerate. Potentially, it 
represents a further policy tool for the state to show leadership on transforming the national 
economy. This may entail the state exercising its shareholder influence to advance 
decarbonisation efforts or address other deep-seated issues facing the UK economy. These 
greater steering powers could help ensure UK businesses become part of establishing a new 
social contract for the post-pandemic age.  
 
(d) Welfare renewal 
It has become clear in recent weeks that a country’s capitalist model is a key mediating factor 
in ‘flattening the curve’, and that a lockdown cannot be effectively or fairly enforced without 
the extension of income protection and access to other benefits where necessary. This has 
reinvigorated debate around welfare provision after decades of austerity. As Peter Sloman 
points out, the deeper the economic crisis becomes, the more pressure seems likely to build for 
some form of Universal Basic Income to sit, most probably, alongside other conditional 
benefits.  
Lyn Brown suggests in this issue that Labour should ‘redouble our efforts to develop arguments 
and policies for universal public services across housing, childcare, social care and education, 
for a real living wage and big increases in child benefit’, which should ultimately become a 
UBI for children. Spain has already declared an intention to introduce a UBI and other countries 
may soon follow suit. Whether or not we rejuvenate the welfare system along these lines, it is 
clear that resilience – for individual households and society as a whole – should become a far 
greater priority. 
The welfare state’s role as a set of ‘macroeconomic stabilisers’ also takes on greater 
significance in the context of an economic downturn and green transition. Shielding workers 
from the market volatility and disruptions pertaining to a low-carbon transition, via welfare 
provision, is essential to ensuring a modicum of equitability as well as the social sustainability 
of any green state project.xvi  
Given the spread of Covid-19 and the ongoing climate crisis, a set of institutions which insulate 
the poorest from market forces (which surely includes strengthened welfare programmes) are 
a vital component of the social contract throughout the (potentially turbulent) transition to a 
post-pandemic and low-carbon economy.  
The agenda outlined here is not by itself sufficient in ensuring a ‘just transition’ to a sustainable 
economy, which will require subsequent phases of political action and economic change, 
including policies designed to remedy the injustices of extractivism pertaining to green 
investment in the Global North.xvii Nor should it be considered a comprehensive progressive 
response to the downturn. We need better deals for ‘key workers’, ‘rooted firms’ and the 
‘foundational economy’, an agenda which will be particularly salient given the recent public 
reappraisal of the value of their work; Will Brett argues in this issue that regional economic 
strategies and a social licensing regime will be key to achieving this, and the Foundational 
Economy Collective has released a plan for strengthening the post-pandemic foundational 
economy.xviii  
Nonetheless, the agenda outlined here highlights four key components of a policy agenda that 
aligns responses to the dual crises of Covid-19 and climate at a moment of critical juncture in 
Britain’s political economy. Furthermore, the outlined agenda, alongside new forms of 
bolstering state capacity (via covert monetary financing and a Sovereign Wealth Fund), signify 
a cumulative shift in Britain’s political and economic landscape conducive to economic 
democratisation and a rebalancing of power away from prevailing social forces. 
 
Conclusion 
The panic of the present moment shouldn’t disguise the fact that other economic challenges 
and priorities exist; not least the necessity of tackling the climate emergency. Simply financing 
the preservation of the economic status quo is dangerous. We need a more strategic and 
discerning use of the state’s resources at a time of fiscal and monetary expansion to engender 
structural change.  
A crisis management response based on this policy agenda would enable a phased and just 
transition to a different kind of post-pandemic economy. It is a response which aligns the 
protection of material livelihoods today, the creation of value for the state, and the promotion 
of more sustainable jobs and economic activity in order to mitigate the climate crisis. 
Moreover, the agenda is complementary with, and helps establish the political-economic 
conditions for, a new and more ambitious economic programme in the aftermath of the 
pandemic. 
The Labour Party will be well aware that the mistakes of the 2008 crisis response cannot be 
repeated. Progressive parties must now explicitly recognise the failings of the ‘old normal’ and 
make the case that fiscal expansion needs to be paired with a transformative agenda. The 
struggle to define the ‘new normal’ is already underway. 
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